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Abstract
Tie-line scheduling in multi-area power systems in the US largely proceeds through a
market-based mechanism called Coordinated Transaction Scheduling (CTS). We analyze this
market mechanism through a game-theoretic lens. Our analysis characterizes the effect of
market liquidity, market participants’ forecasts about inter-area price spreads, transactions
fees and interaction of CTS markets with financial transmission rights. Using real data, we
empirically verify that CTS bidders can employ simple learning algorithms to discover Nash
equilibria that support the conclusions drawn from equilibrium analysis.
1 Introduction
Different parts of an interconnected power grid are controlled and managed by different system
operators (SOs). We call the geographical footprint within each SO’s jurisdiction an area, and
transmission lines that interconnect two different areas as tie-lines. Efficient scheduling of power
flows over tie-lines is paramount to improve market efficiency and exploit geographically diverse
renewable resources. Tie-lines are capable of supplying a significant portion of each area’s elec-
tricity demand. For example, the New York ISO (NYISO) and ISO New England (ISO-NE) share
nine tie-lines with approximately 1800 MW capacity, capable of supplying 12% of New England’s
and 10% of New York’s demand as of 2009 according to White and Pike (2011). Even though
tie-lines are important assets, they have been historically under-utilized as evidenced by the per-
sistent price differences between regional markets (see White and Pike (2011)). The economic loss
from inefficient tie-line schedules has been estimated at $784 million between NYISO and ISO-NE
in 2006-10 (seeWhite and Pike (2011)), the burden of which has been ultimately borne by end-use
customers. What causes such inefficiencies? There are a number of factors that include the in-
herent uncertainty about power requirements when tie-lines are scheduled prior to delivery time
points, the lack of coordination and appropriate information exchange among the SOs, ad hoc use
of proxy buses in deciding the schedule and transaction fees.
Conceptually, power flows over tie-lines should be determined through a joint economic dis-
patch problem geared towards maximizing the efficiency of the interconnected power grid as a
whole. However, historical and legal reasons render such an aggregation of market information
from different areas at a central location untenable. Naturally, a considerable effort has been made
to solve the joint dispatch problem in a distributed fashion, focusing on primal (see Bakirtzis
and Biskas (2003), Zhao et al. (2014)) and dual decomposition methods (see Conejo and Aguado
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(1998), Jie Chen et al. (2004)). In such methods, SOs exchange information among themselves to
compute the optimal tie-line schedule. This theoretical coordination mechanism, referred to as Tie
Optimization (TO) in White and Pike (2011), proved challenging to implement in practice. It was
perceived as requiring the SOs to trade directly with each other, violating their financial neutrality,
in lieu of the earlier market-based, albeit inefficient, process for scheduling tie-line flows. Instead,
many SOs adopted variants of Coordinated Transaction Scheduling (CTS), e.g., see FERC (2012,
2016), that sought to blend the earlier market-based tie-line scheduling with the theoretically opti-
mal TO, after receiving approval from FERC. CTS is a market mechanism in which external market
participants submit bids and offers to import or export from one area to the other. The schedule is
computed using both participants’ offers as well as the SOs’ forecasts about price differences. CTS
market design is predicated on the simple premise that arbitrage opportunity will attract more
participants, whose profit motivation will ultimately shrink that opportunity, pushing the sched-
ule closer to the theoretically optimum. CTS has certainly improved tie-line scheduling as per
Internal Market Monitor (2019), Potomac Economics (2019), but significant inefficiencies remain.
Motivated by these inefficiencies, we analyze the impacts of strategic interactions among CTS
market participants on the performance of these markets through a game theoretic study. We pro-
vide palpable insights on the consequences of an illiquid market, errors in SOs’ price forecasts and
transaction fees on market efficiency. We remark that the use of proxy buses as trading locations
results in the so-called ‘loop flow’ problem (see Cvijic and Ilic (2014)) that negatively impacts CTS
market performance. We refer the reader to Guo et al. (2018) for mechanisms to tackle this prob-
lem, and instead focus on the repercussions of strategic interaction among market participants in
this paper.
We introduce CTS in Section 2. Then, we model CTS as a game among arbitrage bidders who
compete through scalar-parameterized transport offers in Section 3. Our game formulation is in-
spired by supply function competition models considered in Johari and Tsitsiklis (2011), Xu et al.
(2016). We establish the existence of Nash equilibria for this game under mild assumptions and
study the impact of various factors on the nature of said equilibria in Sections 4-6 to offer insights
into the CTS market. First, we show that when transaction costs (levied on a per-megawatt hour
basis on bidders) are absent, then a highly liquid CTS market is efficient. Market efficiency de-
grades with liquidity shortfall, exhibiting bounded efficiency loss for intermediate liquidity and
unbounded losses in low liquidity regimes. Second, with transaction costs, CTS fails to eradicate
the price spread between adjacent markets even with a liquid market, implying that such costs
undercut the vision behind the market design. Third, we show that SOs’ estimate of the price
spread plays a central role in the efficiency of CTS markets in that bidders have limited ability to
correct the effects of SOs’ forecast errors. Fourth, portfolios of financial transmission rights (FTR)
held by CTS bidders can impact CTS market outcomes, revealing the dependency of the efficiency
of these inter-area markets on other energy derivatives. Our equilibrium analysis reveals how the
strategic incentives in CTS markets are oriented but does not illustrate if bidders can learn equilib-
rium behavior through repeated participation in these markets. We simulate repeated play using
historical data from the NYISO–ISO-NE market and demonstrate that our conclusions from equi-
librium analysis continue to hold in a statistical sense in our numerical experiments. All proofs
are relegated to the Appendix.
2
2 The CTS Mechanism
CTS is a market-based mechanism for tie-line scheduling that replaced an earlier market-based
structure in an effort to streamline the bidding and scheduling process. Among the important
changes, CTS unified the bid submission and clearing process among the neighboring SOs, re-
duced the tie-line schedule duration from one hour to 15-minute intervals, and decreased time
delays among bidding, scheduling, and power delivery. To illustrate the economic rationale of
the CTS mechanism we consider throughout a stylized two-area power system, shown in Figure
1, connected via a single tie-line with the inter-area power flow denoted by Q. Each SO computes
their supply stacks by solving an area-wise parametric economic dispatch by varying the amount
of power Q flowing on the tie-line. An example of supply stack is shown in Figure 1. The stack
of area a represents the incremental dispatch cost of delivering power at its side of the interface.
Similarly, the stack of area b represents the decremental dispatch cost of reduced supply, shown
in descending order. Since scheduling happens prior to power delivery, these stacks are based
on SOs’ forecasts. In this example, the optimal direction for the power flow is from area a to b
since for zero scheduled flow, area b operates at higher dispatch costs than area a. At the level
where dispatch costs at the border become equal or where the supply stacks intersect, is the TO
schedule, denoted by QTO. This tie-line schedule minimizes the aggregate dispatch costs across
the two areas, and it serves as our theoretical benchmark to compare CTS performance. However,
TO requires SOs to trade directly with each other on behalf of the market participants in their re-
spective areas, which may be viewed as the SOs becoming active participants of trade rather than
financially neutral market operators. Instead, the current practice of CTS relies on virtual traders
whose offers/bids are utilized together with the supply stacks to arrive at the tie-line schedule.
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Figure 1: Illustration of the TO and CTS scheduling mechanisms.
CTS market participants in practice submit ‘interface’ bids that consist of three elements: the
minimum price difference between the proxy buses in the two areas the bidder is willing to accept,
the maximum quantity to be transacted and the direction of the trade, i.e., the source and the sink.
A CTS market participant is a virtual bidder in that she can offer to transport power across areas
without physically consuming or producing it. They only participate in the scheduling process,
bearing no obligation for physical power delivery; the transaction is purely financial.
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Under CTS, one of the SOs pools the virtual bids at the proxy buses and the supply stacks
from both operators to assemble the aggregate interface supply stack, shown in Figure 1. All the
bids indicating the optimal direction are stacked from lowest to highest price to create their own
“supply curve”. The price spread curve is derived by subtracting the supply stack of area a from
that of area b. The CTS schedule, denoted by QCTS, is set at the intersection of the interface supply
stack and the price spread. An interface bid is accepted if its offer price is less than the price spread
at the tie-line schedule. Therefore, all interface bids to the left of the CTS schedule are accepted;
all bids to the right are not. All cleared interface bids are settled at the real-time proxy bus LMPs
and there are not uplift credits or debits associated with tie-line schedules. In the next section, we
extract a theoretical model for CTS and characterize its outcome under strategic interactions of
interface bidders against the outcome of TO.
3 Modeling the CTS Market as a game
We model the CTS market as a game among the virtual bidders who compete to transport power
over a tie-line against an elastic inter-area price spread that varies with the power flow over the
tie-line.1 Recall that LMPs at the proxy bus in each area comes from the solution to an area-wise
economic dispatch problem, parameterized by the tie-line power flowQ. For areas a and b, denote
these LMPs by Pa(Q) and Pb(Q), respectively. Without loss of generality, let area a export and area
b import power, and define
P(Q) := Pb(Q)− Pa(Q) (1)
as the price spread between the areas. Assume without loss of generality that P is strictly decreas-
ing, concave and differentiable in Q ≥ 0 with P(0) > 0. Note that P acts as the inverse demand
function in a supply competition model with virtual bidders. Our framework adopts standard
assumptions on the demand function that are employed in several supply function competition
models in the study of electricity markets (see Green and Newbery (1992), Baldick et al. (2004),
Rudkevich (2003)).
Consider N virtual bidders in the CTS market. Let the i-th bidder provide two parameters
θi, Bi to the SOs with the understanding that she is willing to transport up to
xi(p) := Bi − θi
p
, θi ≥ 0 (2)
amount of power from area a to b at a price spread of p. Our transport offer is inspired by supply
function competition models studied in Johari and Tsitsiklis (2011), Xu et al. (2016), Ndrio et al.
(2020). Figure 2 reveals how the parameters θi, Bi affect the shape of the transport offer. Bidder
i is willing to transport a maximum quantity of Bi, but at a minimum price spread of θi/Bi. The
required price difference increases with the power transport and grows unbounded as the latter
approaches Bi. In effect, transporting power above Bi requires an infinite price difference. The
parameterized “hockey-stick” shaped transport offer in (2) is a smooth approximation to the one
in practice where a player is willing to transport up to Bi at a specified price difference. The
realized price spread is uncertain and a higher Bi exposes the player to a higher potential loss.
1The study in White and Pike (2011) indicates that the primary interface between NYISO–ISO-NE was congested
0.3% of the hours eastbound and 1.2% of the hours westbound in 2009. Hence, to avoid unneccessary complication of
the analysis and facilitate exposition, we ignore the total transfer capability of the tie-line in modeling the CTS game.
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Therefore, bidder i expresses her total budget for potential losses or her liquidity in Bi. Notice that
since Bi’s express budget constraints for the bidders, we assume Bi does not vary strategically in
day-to-day transactions.
p
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Figure 2: Parameterized interface bid of CTS market participant.
The family of transport offers in (2) allows market participants to have one-dimensional ac-
tion spaces and has been shown to possess a number of attractive properties including bounded
price of anarchy and price markup at the Nash equilibrium Johari and Tsitsiklis (2011), Xu et al.
(2016). Moreover, they prohibit situations when market participants can bid above their means by
explicitly incorporating maximum budget/capacity in the offer structure, which is not straight-
forward to do with e.g. linear supply functions Baldick et al. (2004). Other families of supply offer
such as the (degenerate) pure price (Bertrand) or quantity (Cournot) competition are not suitable
representations of the CTS interface bid. Although variations of the Bertrand model with capac-
ity constraints may seem an attractive alternative, however, in such settings pure Nash equilibria
may not exist Shubik (1959).
Given the liquidities B1, . . . , BN , the choice of bids θ1, . . . , θN from the CTS bidders describe
their willingness to transport power across the interface according to (2). Collect the liquidities
and bids in θ and B, respectively. The SOs allocate the aggregate tie-line schedule among N
virtual bidders, given θ,B as follows. They calculate x∗ := (x∗1, . . . , x∗N ) as the allocations of the
tie-line flow to the participants by solving
x∗(θ,B) :=argmax
x∈RN
∫ 1ᵀ x
0
P(z)dz −
N∑
i=1
∫ xi
0
θi
Bi − sds, (3a)
subject to 0 ≤ xi ≤ Bi, i = 1, . . . , N, (3b)
where, R denotes the set of real numbers and 1 is a vector of all ones. The above problem seeks a
tie-line schedule where the offer stack for inter-area power transport from CTS market participants
intersects the SOs’ estimated price spread function. The tie-line schedule is then given by
QCTS(θ,B) := 1
ᵀ
x∗(θ,B).
The transport offer in (2) enters the SOs’ problem through its implied cost of transport. This
induced cost is calculated by equating the implied marginal cost curve to the transport offer. With
this interpretation, the SOs’ flow allocation problem in (3) seeks to maximize the social welfare
of an economy that is composed of the wholesale markets in areas a and b together with the
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CTS bidders (see Guo et al. (2018) for a similar interpretation of the CTS market objective). CTS
identifies a single clearing price p(θ,B) for its market as
p(θ,B) = P(QCTS(θ,B)). (4)
The CTS flow allocation to bidder i and the resulting CTS tie-line schedule are respectively
given by
x∗i (θ,B) = Bi −
θi
p(θ,B)
, (5)
QCTS(θ,B) = 1
ᵀ
B − 1
ᵀ θ
p(θ,B)
. (6)
Note that when 1ᵀ B ≥ P−1(0), we have p(θ,B) > 0 when 1ᵀ θ > 0 and p(θ,B) = 0 for 1ᵀ θ = 0.
To avoid difficulties due to a zero price, we adopt the convention from Johari and Tsitsiklis (2011)
xi(0,B) = Bi, for p(θ,B) = 0.
Within our notational framework, TO determines the tie-line schedule as
QTO = argmax
Q≥0
W(Q) :=
∫ Q
0
P(z)dz, (7)
that seeks to maximizeW , a measure of welfare for the wholesale markets in areas a and b. QTO
is given by the schedule determined by the no-arbitrage condition, i.e., where the price spread
vanishes. Notice that W equals the CTS market objective in (3) with θ = 0. Thus, we expect
CTS to emulate TO only when all bidders bid zero θ’s. We now proceed to formally define the
CTS game and characterize its Nash equilibrium to understand what bidding behavior we expect,
given the bidders’ strategic incentives.
While virtual bidders do not incur any costs to physically transport power, many pairs of SOs
levy transaction fees on a per-MWh basis, e.g., in CTS between NYISO and PJM, NYISO charges
physical exports to PJM at a rate ranging from $4-$8 per MWh, while PJM charges physical imports
and exports rates that average less than $3 per MWh. See Potomac Economics (2019) for details.
For a willingness to transport xi MW of power from area a to b, assume that transaction cost
equals c · xi, where c is measured in $/MWh. Then, each bidder’s payoff equals the total revenue
garnered less the transaction costs, formally given in
pii(θi,θ−i) = P (QCTS(θ,B))x∗i (θ,B)− cx∗i (θ,B). (8)
Formally, define G(B, c) as the CTS game among N virtual bidders—henceforth referred to as
players—who bid θ ≥ 0, given B, and receive a payoff described by (8). Bidders selfishly seek to
maximize their own payoffs, given their liquidities. A bid profile θNE constitutes a Nash equilibrium
of G(B, c), if
pii
(
θNEi ,θ
NE
−i
)
≥ pii
(
θi,θ
NE
−i
)
for all θi ≥ 0. That is, no player has an incentive for a unilateral deviation from the equilibrium
offer. We establish the existence of such an equilibrium profile in our first result.
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Theorem 1 (Existence of Nash Equilibrium) The CTS game G(B, c) admits a Nash equilibrium if P
satisfies
P ′′(Q)(1ᵀ B −Q) ≥ 2P ′(Q) (9)
for 0 ≤ Q ≤ 1ᵀB.
Our proof relies on Rosen’s result in Rosen (1965) after we establish that G(B, c) is a concave game.
Uniqueness of the equilibrium remains challenging to prove. However, in the next sections, we
will establish uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium under a number of settings.
To explicitly characterize the Nash equilibrium we restrict our attention to affine price spreads
P(Q) := α− βQ (10)
with α, β > 0 to compute the equilibria and study its properties. It is straightforward to verify
that P as defined above satisfies (9) and hence, an equilibrium always exists for G(B, c, α, β),
according to Theorem 1. Indeed, the price spread can be shown to be affine in Q, when each
area is represented as a copperplate power system, having a generator with quadratic generation
cost and a fixed demand. This follows from properties of multiparametric quadratic programs
in (Borelli et al. 2014, Theorem 7.6). To further justify our modeling choice, we perform a linear
regression of New England’s LMP at the proxy bus (Roseton) as PNE = w1PNY + w2Q + w3,
and obtain w1 ≈ 1.0 with an adjusted R2 coefficient of 0.91, revealing an affine dependency of
PNY − PNE in Q. Encouraged by this data analysis, we now proceed to analyze the CTS market
with strategic participants for the affine price spread model.
4 Impact of Liquidity in CTS Markets
Our first goal is to investigate the impacts of liquidity on the CTS scheduling efficiency. To isolate
the effects of liquidity, neglect transaction fees and set c ≈ 0. We define the efficiency of CTS as
the ratio
ηCTS(B) :=
W (QCTS(θNE,B))
W (QTO) ,
where recall that W measures the aggregate welfare of the wholesale markets in the two areas
attained at a particular tie-line schedule. TO seeks to maximize this welfare with QTO = α/β,
while the outcome of CTS arises from the strategic interaction of the market participants. Our
next result characterizes the equilibrium and provides key insights into the behavior of ηCTS ≤ 1
in different liquidity regimes.
Proposition 1 Consider the CTS game G(B, 0, α, β), where Bm is the unique maximal budget in
{B1, . . . , BN}. Then, G(B, 0, α, β) admits a unique Nash equilibrium θNE given by
θNEm =

1
4β
(
β2Bm − P2(1ᵀ B)
)
, if |1ᵀ B − α/β| < Bm,
0, otherwise,
(11)
and θNEi = 0 for i 6= m. Furthermore, we have
ηCTS(B)

= 1, if 1ᵀ B − α/β ≥ Bm,
≥ 3
4
, if |1ᵀ B − α/β| < Bm,
= 2x− x2, otherwise
, (12)
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where x := β1ᵀ B/α.
Existence of the equilibrium follows from Theorem 1. The rest follows from analysis of the first-
order equilibrium conditions. The result highlights that allocation and the efficiency vary widely
with liquidity and the player with the maximal liquidity plays a rather central role in determin-
ing the outcome of the CTS market. To offer more insights, distinguish three different liquidity
regimes. Identify the liquidity as high when 1ᵀB−α/β ≥ Bm, where the aggregate liquidity of all
players but m is sufficient to cover the efficient schedule QTO = α/β. The intermediate liquidity
occurs where the aggregate liquidity is different from QTO by at most the liquidity of player m,
i.e., |1ᵀ B − α/β| < Bm. Finally, the low liquidity regime is where 1ᵀ B + Bm < QTO. The out-
come and the efficiency differ substantially across these regimes. Using the equilibrium profile, it
is easy to see that the flow allocation is given by
x∗m(θ
NE,B) =
{
1
2 (α/β − 1ᵀ B−m), if |1ᵀ B − α/β| < Bm,
Bm, otherwise,
,
x∗i (θ
NE,B) = Bi, i 6= m,
where B−m denotes the vector of liquidities of all players, except m. Thus, all but player m offer
their maximum liquidity at equilibrium. These players benefit from being inframarginal, exploit-
ing the bid of the marginal player m. This behavior is reminiscent of the so-called ‘free-rider
problem’ (see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)). When the liquidity is too high or too low, player m
does not have enough market power and does not benefit from bidding nonzero θm, implying
that she does not withhold from her maximal budget Bm in her transport offer. In the intermedi-
ate liquidity case, player m enjoys market power and her flow allocation can be shown to be the
Cournot best response to this residual price spread P(Q − 1ᵀ B−m). See Cai et al. (2019), Hobbs
(2001) for details on Cournot competition.
The tie-line schedule at the equilibrium of G(B, 0, α, β) is given by
QCTS =

QTO, if 1
ᵀ B −Bm ≥ α/β,
1
2 (QTO + 1
ᵀ B−m) , if |1ᵀ B − α/β| < Bm,
1
ᵀ B, otherwise.
When liquidity is high, QCTS coincides with QTO, implying that CTS yields the SOs’ intended
outcome. In other words, perfect competition arises as a result of strategic incentives. In the inter-
mediate liquidity regime, CTS suffers welfare loss due to strategic interaction. The loss, however,
is bounded; strategic behavior cannot cripple the welfare under perfect competition by more than
25%. When the liquidity is low, the lower bound on ηCTS can be small. However, in this case lack
of efficiency is not due to strategic interactions but rather due to the very low market liquidity.
4.1 Learning equilibria through repeated play
Nash equilibria characterize how the incentives of market participants are oriented. However,
the power of said equilibria to predict market outcomes may appear limited in that players are
endowed with intelligence over their opponents’ payoff and the system conditions to compute
such an equilibrium. In practice, players interact repeatedly exploring the market environment
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while facing a noisy reward. Motivated to investigate if players can learn equilibria through re-
peated play, we study the game dynamics where bidders adopt action-value methods (see Sutton
and Bart (2018)) to update their bids. More precisely, we implement an upper confidence bound
(UCB) algorithm for each bidder. In such a setting, each player is agnostic to the presence of other
players and the SOs’ clearing process, i.e., they endogenize these as part of the environment that
yields a random reward. UCB is a popular reinforcement learning algorithm that achieves loga-
rithmic regret per Auer and Ortner (2010), L. Lai and Robbins (1985) in static environments and
balances between exploration and exploitation. In each round (an instance of a CTS market), each
player selects the action that has the maximum observed payoff thus far plus some exploration
bonus.
The game proceeds as follows. At each round, each bidder chooses θ from a finite set of actions
Θ := {θ1, . . . , θM}. Each bidder maintains a vector R ∈ RM of average rewards from each action
and the number of times T ∈ NM each action is chosen, whereN denotes the set of naturals. Here,
the reward equals the revenue less the transaction cost from the CTS market. Bidders initialize R
by selecting every action (possible bid from Θ) at least once. Upon bidding θk ∈ Θ at a certain
round, say she receives the reward rk from the CTS market. Then, the bidder updates T k and Rk
as
T k ← T k + 1, Rk ← Rk + 1
T k
(
rk −Rk
)
. (13)
Then, the bidder bids the action θk, where
k = argmax
j∈{1,...,M}
{
Rj + ρ
√
ln (1ᵀ T )/T j
}
, (14)
The parameter ρ > 0 controls the degree of exploration. The larger the ρ, the player is eager to
explore actions that have not been tried often enough. The smaller the ρ, the player tends to choose
an action largely based on the average reward seen thus far.
We utilize historical CTS data from the NYISO and ISONE markets to compute the affine price
spread that yields QTO = 1493 MW. We consider repeated play of the CTS game with five partici-
pants, first with B = (298, 223, 194, 149, 893) and then with B = (596, 522, 640, 373, 893). The first
example corresponds to an intermediate liquidity regime with θNE = (0, 0, 0, 0, 4882). The second
example belongs to the high liquidity category for which θNE = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0). In our simulations,
we use ρ = 2 following (Sutton and Bart 2018, Chapter 2). Each CTS bidder chooses from ten θ’s
in Θ = [0, 6000] that includes the optimal actions. Figure 3 shows percentages of optimal actions
selected by bidders in a total of 3000 games for the high and intermediate liquidity regimes.
In the intermediate regime, the pivotal and inframarginal players act in a rather ‘greedy’ fash-
ion, exploiting their optimal action north of 99% of the games. This implies that the observed
reward from playing the optimal action is large enough, even as the exploration bonus of other
actions increases. Bidder 5 loses her role as the marginal player when the liquidity is high. In
this regime, players are slower to discover their optimal actions, although selection percentages
are north of 88% of the games. Our numerical experiments clearly demonstrate that even in a
setting where players know little to nothing about the game setting, they are able to discover and
play equilibrium actions (in majority of the games) through repeated play. This experiment lends
credence to the conclusions from our equilibrium analysis. Indeed, QCTS/QTO in Figure 4 remains
close to unity and price spreads are below $2/MWh in most games for a highly liquid CTS mar-
ket. A liquidity reduction of around 40% has palpable effects on market performance, although in
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(a) Intermediate liquidity (b) High liquidity
Figure 3: Plot of cumulative percentage of times the Nash action is chosen across 3000 games for bidders
1 ( ) and 5 ( ). Bidder 5 is marginal for (a) and inframarginal for (b). After 3000 games, bidders 1-5
respectively select θNE in (99.9, 92.1, 99.9, 99.6, 99.2)% games in (a) and (90.1, 99.9, 86.4, 92.4, 88.2)% games
in (b).
(a) Tie-line schedules (b) Price spread
Figure 4: Comparison of tie-line schedules and price spreads for a highly ( ) and intermediately liquid
( ) CTS market.
aggregate, the players have the capacity to meet QTO. In particular, the price spread for interme-
diate liquidity is more than $6/MWh higher than the highly liquid case and QCTS/QTO remains
well below 80%. This experiment highlights how rise of pivotal players exercising market power
exploiting the lack of liquidity can impact market performance.
5 Interactions with Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs)
CTS performance may be influenced by potential uneconomic bidding that aims to benefit finan-
cial positions whose value is tied to CTS outcomes, such as FTRs. Price manipulation that involves
uneconomic virtual transactions has emerged as a central policy concern for FERC, as shown by
several high-profile enforcement cases that ended in multi-million dollar settlements (see Ledger-
wood and Pfeifenberger (2013)). Here, we investigate the CTS performance when any subgroup of
market participants hold FTR positions. An FTR is a unidirectional financial instrument, defined
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in megawatts, from a source node to a sink node. One unit of an FTR entitles its holder a payment
equal to the difference between the LMPs at the sink and the source nodes (see Apostolopoulou
et al. (2013), Bushnell (1999)). We focus on FTR positions that negatively impact CTS.
Denote by fki , the FTR megawatt position of CTS bidder i from an internal node k inside area
b to the CTS trading location. Let Pkb denote the LMP at node k in area b. Recall that we have
assumed so far that Pb − Pa has an affine dependence on Q, the amount that flows from bus a to
bus b. In general, Pb − Pkb will also depend on Q. Assume a similar affine dependence
Pb(Q)− Pkb (Q) = αkin − βkinQ
for an internal node k. Albeit simplistic, this model is enough to reveal the impact of FTRs on CTS
markets. The payoff of bidder i from her FTR positions then becomes
∑
k(α
k
in − βkinQ)fki , where
the sum is taken with k ranging over buses within area b. To illustrate the coupling between FTR
positions and CTS market, consider the joint payoff from them for bidder i in
p˜ii(θi,θ−i) = (α− βQ)Bi − θi︸ ︷︷ ︸
from CTS
+
∑
k
(αkin − βkinQ)fki︸ ︷︷ ︸
from FTR
, (15)
where Q depends on CTS market clearing with bids θ and liquidities B. Formally, call this game
GFTR (B, c, α, β,f ,αin,βin) with payoffs in (15). Here, αin, βin, f collect the respective variables
across all internal buses. Our next result characterizes the market outcome with FTR positions.
Proposition 2 The game GFTR (B, 0, α, β,f ,αin,βin) admits a unique Nash equilibrium if f is element-
wise nonnegative, for which the tie-line schedule at the equilibrium is
QCTS =

QTO, if 1
ᵀ B − B˜m ≥ α/β,
1
2
(
QTO + 1
ᵀ B − B˜m
)
, if |1ᵀ B − α/β| < B˜m,
1
ᵀ B, otherwise,
where B˜i = Bi +
∑
k(β
k/β)fki for i = 1, . . . , N and m is the only player with maximal B˜m.
Our proof again appeals to Rosen’s result and the rest relies on analyzing the first-order conditions
for equilibrium. The result reveals that the bidder with maximum combined CTS and FTR position
emerges as the pivotal player in this market. Moreover, B˜m ≥ Bm dictates that less power is
scheduled to flow in the tie-line when bidders have such FTR positions. This results from the
incentives of the pivotal player who benefits from higher prices at the importing region b’s proxy
bus as that yields a higher FTR payoff. In fact, the difference in the tie-line schedules with and
without FTR grows with the difference between B˜m and Bm that is directly proportional to the
FTR positions. Opposite conclusions can be drawn if we consider players with FTR positions that
source at area b’s proxy bus.
The following example illustrates the shift in market power and scheduling efficiency when
participants hold FTRs. Consider the CTS market in Section 4.1 where the fifth bidder is pivotal
in the intermediate liquidity regime. At the equilibrium, QCTS = 1176 MW. Assume that the first
bidder holds an FTR f1 = 800 MW to an internal bus for which αin = 35.7 and βin = 0.02, while
the rest of players do not have FTR portfolios. Then, B˜ = [1018, 463, 193, 149, 893]. Notice that
bidder one emerges as the new marginal bidder and has incentive to bid in a way that leads to less
power being scheduled to flow into area b. Indeed, the new tie-line schedule is QCTS = 1113 MW,
63 MW less than CTS without FTRs, falling even shorter of QTO = 1493 MW.
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6 Impact of Forecast Errors and Transaction Costs
Our analysis of the CTS game so far has assumed that players and the SOs have perfect forecasts
into the price spread function. In practice, tie-line scheduling takes place with a lead time to power
delivery, meaning that there is an inherent uncertainty in the price spread when these markets
are convened. To model this uncertainty, assume that the SOs conjecture an affine price spread
function
PSO(Q) = αSO − βSOQ
with αSO, βSO > 0. The SOs use this spread to clear the CTS market as in (3). Let the realized price
difference be
P?(Q) = α? − β?Q
with α?, β? > 0. Then, the TO schedule and the optimal tie-line schedule, respectively, are given
by
QTO = αSO/βSO and Q? = α?/β?.
Modeling the uncertainty explicitly at the time of scheduling reveals that QTO may not equal Q?,
the ex-post optimal tie-line schedule. Our interest lies in analyzing if strategic behavior of bidders
in the CTS market can correct the errors in SOs’ forecasts. Do bidders draw the outcome closer
to Q? than QTO or do they drive it further away as a result of their strategic interaction? We
answer this question through a game-theoretic study. We also derive insights into how non-zero
transaction fees (c > 0) affect these conclusions.
To isolate the impacts of uncertainty and transaction fees, we analyze the game under a simpler
setting where the bidders are homogenous, each with liquidityB > 0 and conjectured price spread
P(Q) = α − βQ with α, β > 0. Notice that bidders’ conjectured optimal schedule α/β may be
different from both QTO and Q?. We assume here that players share a common belief that the
market operates at an intermediate liquidity where the aggregate liquidity NB is close to her
conjectured optimal tie-line schedule α/β, i.e.,
NB = α/β +O(1/N). (16)
Under such an assumption, bidder i conjectures the market price from bidding θ with liquidities
B = B1 to be
p (θ, B1) =
1
2
(
P(NB) +
√
P2(NB) + 4β1ᵀ θ
)
=
√
β1ᵀ θ +O(1/N),
which yields the following perceived payoff for bidder i.
pii(θi,θ−i) = p(θ,B)B − θi − c
(
B − θi
p (θ, B1)
)
≈
√
β1ᵀ θB − θi − c
(
B − θi√
β1ᵀ θ
)
. (17)
Call the CTS game with conjectured price spreads Gconj(B, c, α, β, αSO, βSO), where α, β satisfy (16)
and the payoffs are given by (17). Assuming that all players offer based on an equilibrium profile
for this game, the SOs then solve the CTS flow allocation problem in (3) with PSO to ultimately
compute the tie-line schedule. Our next result characterizes both a (symmetric) equilibrium profile
and the resulting tie-line schedule.
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Proposition 3 The CTS game Gconj(B, c, α, β, αSO, βSO) admits a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium
given by θNEi =
γ2
4Nβ for i = 1, . . . , N , for which the tie-line schedule at equilibrium is
QCTS =
1
2
QTO +NB −
√
(QTO −NB)2 + γ
2
ββSO
 ,
where γ := c(2− 1/N) + βB.
Our proof leverages the result in (Chen et al. 2004, Theorem 3) and the analysis of first-order
conditions for a symmetric equilibrium of the game. Notice that players bid solely based on their
own conjectures. The tie-line schedule, however, depends on the conjectures of both the bidders
and the SOs. This result will allow us to study the effect of price spread forecasts and transaction
costs on the scheduling efficiency in the sequel.
The lack of knowledge of Q? by the SOs and market participants prompts us to investigate
whether CTS can yield a more efficient schedule than the pure SO-driven TO. Proposition 3 implies
QCTS ≤ QTO, meaning that CTS cannot yield a more efficient schedule than TO if QTO < Q?.
Hence, CTS can only outperform TO when the SOs’ forecast overestimates QTO. In this regime,
Figure 1 yields that QCTS is always closer to Q? when Q? ≤ QTO/2. Outside of this setting, the
outcome of CTS depends on the liquidity and conjectures of players. Specifically, ifNB ∈ A1∪A2,
defined in Figure 5, QCTS is closer to Q? than QTO, if
γ2
ββSO
≤ 8 (QTO −Q?) (QTO − 2Q? +NB) . (18)
Such a premise appears to run counter to the intuition that TO is optimal. This situation can only
arise under uncertainty where SOs make serious forecast errors in the expected price spread. Sur-
prisingly, forecast errors are not that rare, according to Potomac Economics (2019), where the error
in SOs’ point forecast for the price spread between NYISO and ISO-NE averaged $2.42/MWh. No-
tice how, in this liquidity regime, the presence of transaction fees makes it harder to satisfy (18).
This is intuitively correct since transaction fees drive the tie-line schedule toward smaller val-
ues, as established in Proposition 3. When NB ∈ A3 ∪ A4, liquidity is sufficiently high and the
Figure 5: Ability of market participants to correct SO’s forecast error depends on liquidity and transactions
costs.
presence of costs might improve scheduling efficiency since players bid higher prices to counter
costs. Overall, players ability to correct SOs’ forecast is somewhat limited and relies on many
qualifications, indicating that the SOs forecasts and systematic bias plays a vital role in scheduling
efficiency. Moving bid submittal and clearing timelines closer to power delivery should improve
the efficiency of CTS.
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Figure 6: The trajectory of CTS schedules cleared against SO’s forecasted prices with 10% error with c = 0
and c = $8/MWh.
Proposition 3 suggests that incentives of CTS bidders are aligned in a way that allows them to
correct SOs’ forecast errors in some settings. Can players learn such equilibria through repeated
play. We employ the learning framework in Section 4.1, where players have their bids cleared
against (αSO, βSO) that are perturbed from (α?, β?) learned from historical data. That is, in every
round, bidders receive reward from the ex-post price spread described by P?. The trajectory of
tie-line schedules in Figure 6 with c = 0 reveals that bidding behavior of players results in CTS
schedules consistently closer to the ex-post optimal than TO. Despite the SO’s persistent forecast
error, bidders ‘correct’ the tie-line schedule to an extent by seeking actions that maximize their
observed reward.
The relation in (18) reveals that presence of nonzero transaction fees c make it more difficult
for CTS market to drive the outcome closer to the ex-post optimal as γ increases with c. Bidders
reacting to observed rewards with c = $8/MWh in Figure 6 yield a CTS schedule farther from
Q?, seeking actions that yield higher prices but smaller schedules. This result corroborates our
theoretical finding that transaction fees impede bidders’ ability to correct SOs’ forecast errors.
Notice that equilibrium bid grows with c, per Proposition 3. With c > 0, bidders are reluctant to
offer their entire liquidity. A similar result can be shown under more general settings of Theorem
1. This may prevent the price spread from converging to zero, even if the market is liquid. And,
transaction fees make it less attractive for CTS bidders overall, hurting long-term liquidity of
the CTS market. Figure 7a indicates that the price spread in the CTS market between NYISO
and PJM exhibits longer excursions from zero and higher volatility compared to that between
NYISO and ISO-NE, depicted in Figure 7b. The average absolute spread between NYISO and
PJM is approximately $3.3/MWh higher than that between NYISO and ISO-NE. We surmise that
transaction fees between NYISO and PJM and the lack thereof between NYISO and ISO-NE are
largely responsible for this difference.
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A Proof of Theorem 1.
The proof aims to establish that G (B, c) is a concave N-person game and there exists a Nash
equilibrium. First, we show that (9) is a sufficient condition forQCTS(θ,B) to be a convex function
in θ. We utilize this result to prove that x∗i (θ,B) is continuous and convex in θi. For ease of
exposition, throughout the proof we drop the dependence on B and the CTS subscript from Q.
From (6) we have
1
ᵀ
θ = (1
ᵀ
B −Q)P(Q) := g(Q). (19)
We have g(0) > 0 and g is continuous and strictly decreasing in Q. Hence, g is invertible and its
inverse g−1 is continuous and crosses 1ᵀ θ at a unique value. Hence, Q is continuous in θ. To
make the first term of (8) concave in θi for θ−i fixed, we require g to be convex or
g′′(Q) = P ′′(Q)(1ᵀ B −Q)− 2P ′(Q) ≥ 0. (20)
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Then,Q(θ) is the inverse of a decreasing, convex function and is therefore convex itself. Moreover,
given that P and Q are continuous, then x∗i is continuous in θ. From (5) and (19), we can rewrite
the CTS allocation as
x∗i (θ) = Bi −
θi
1ᵀ θ
(1
ᵀ
B −Q),
with its first derivative satisfying
∂x∗i (θ)
∂θi
= − 1
ᵀ θ−i
(1ᵀ θ)2
(1
ᵀ
B −Q) + θi
1ᵀ θ
∂Q(θ)
∂θi
< 0. (21)
Therefore, the CTS allocation is strictly decreasing in θi. It remains to show that x∗i is convex in θi
for θ−i fixed. Computing the second derivative we have
∂2x∗i (θ)
∂θ2i
= 2
1
ᵀ θ−i
(1ᵀ θ)3
(1
ᵀ
B −Q) + 2 1
ᵀ θ−i
(1ᵀ θ)2
∂Q(θ)
∂θi
+
θi
1ᵀ θ
∂2Q(θ)
∂θ2i
. (22)
The last term in (22) is nonnegative by convexity of Q. Therefore, we require the sum of the
remaining terms to be non-negative or
1
ᵀ B −Q
1ᵀ θ
≥ −∂Q(θ)
∂θi
.
Differentiating both sides of (19) with respect to θi we have
∂Q(θ)
∂θi
=
1
P ′(Q)(1ᵀ B −Q)− P(Q) . (23)
Furthermore, from (19) we have
1
ᵀ B −Q
1ᵀ θ
=
1
P(Q) ≥
1
P(Q)− P ′(Q)(1ᵀ B −Q) = −
∂Q(θ)
∂θi
. (24)
Note that −P ′(Q)(1ᵀ B − Q) ≥ 0 since the price spread is decreasing in the tie-line schedule.
Hence, x∗i is convex in θi for every player i given θ−i. As such, the cost term c · x∗i (θ) is convex in
θi, ∀ i ∈ N . Moreover, P(Q(θ)) is concave in θi since the price spread is concave and decreasing in
Q and Q(θ) is convex in θ. It follows that the payoffs given by (8) is continuous in θ and concave
in θi.
Notice that x∗i is decreasing in θi and approaches negative infinity as θi grows unbounded.
Hence, there exists a unique threshold value θmaxi > 0 above which the transport offer becomes
negative. As such, players have no incentive to bid θi > θmaxi since that yields negative payoff.
Consider the game Gˆ (B, c) with strategy spaces restricted to the compact interval [0, θmaxi ] , ∀i ∈
N . Then, any Nash equilibrium of Gˆ (B, c) is a Nash equilibrium of G (B, c) as well. We have
established that Gˆ (B, c) is a concave N-person game where the strategy space of each player is
a compact, convex, nonempty subset of R. Applying Rosen’s existence theorem (Rosen 1965,
Theorem 1), we conclude that a Nash equilibrium θNE exists for Gˆ (B, c) and therefore for G (B, c)
as well.
17
B Proof of Proposition 1
Existence of the Nash equilibrium follows from Theorem 1. Solving (3) we find that QCTS(θ,B) is
given by
QCTS(θ,B) =
α+ β1ᵀ B
2β
− 1
2β
[P2 (1ᵀ B)+ 4β1ᵀ θ]1/2 . (25)
The payoff for player i is given by
pii(θi,θ−i) = (α− βQCTS(θ,B))Bi − θi
=
Bi
2
(
P(1ᵀ B) + [P2(1ᵀ B) + 4β1ᵀ θ]1/2)− θi. (26)
The payoff is continuous in θ−i and strictly concave in θi. Note that pii(θi,θ−i) becomes negative
for θi > βB2i . Hence, we restrict our attention to for a Nash equilibrium in the compact interval[
0, βB2i
]
. A bid profile θNE =
(
θNE1 , . . . , θ
NE
N
)
is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
∂pii(θi,θ−i)
∂θi
∣∣∣∣
θNE
≤ 0, if 0 ≤ θNEi < βB2i (27a)
∂pii(θi,θ−i)
∂θi
∣∣∣∣
θNE
≥ 0, if 0 < θNEi ≤ βB2i , (27b)
where the above derivative is given by
∂pii(θi,θ−i)
∂θi
=
βBi
[P2(1ᵀ B) + 4β1ᵀ θ]1/2
− 1. (28)
From (28) we deduce that the payoff derivative cannot vanish for more than one player. Moreover,
no player would bid θNEi = βB
2
i since that yields negative payoff and each player profitably devi-
ates by infinitesimally decreasing θi. From the previous discussion and the following observation
∂pim(θm,θ−m)
∂θm
>
∂pii(θi,θ−i)
∂θi
, i 6= m (29)
we conclude that θNE−m = 0. In search for positive θm > 0 we find that
• If |1ᵀ B − α/β| < Bm, then
θNEm =
β2B2m − P2(1ᵀ B)
4β
> 0. (30)
• Otherwise, θNEm = 0 since (30) yields a negative value.
To prove the bounds on ηCTS(B) first note that the social welfare attains its maximum at Q = QTO
with
W(QTO) = α
2
2β
. (31)
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Hence, in the high liquidity regime, i.e., 1ᵀ B − Bm ≥ α/β, QCTS = QTO and ηCTS(B) = 1. In the
intermediate regime, the social welfare at QCTS is
W(QCTS) = α
2
(
α
β
+ 1
ᵀ
B−m
)
− β
8
(
α
β
+ 1
ᵀ
B−m
)2
=
3
4
(
α2
2β
)
+
1
ᵀ B−m
4
(
α− 1
2
β1
ᵀ
B−m
)
>
3
4
W(QTO). (32)
Finally, in the low liquidity regime, i.e., 1ᵀ B +Bm ≤ α/β, we have
W(QCTS)
W(QTO) =
1
α2
(
2β(1
ᵀ
B)
(
α− β
2
1
ᵀ
B
))
=
2β1ᵀ B
α
− β
2(1ᵀ B)2
α2
= 2x− x2. (33)
C Proof of Proposition 2
It is easy to verify that (15) is concave in θi for fixed θ−i and f nonnegative. Moreover, Q is strictly
decreasing in θi and as θi grows large the price spreads approach the limiting values α and αk.
Hence, in (15) the first two terms converge to constant values with the affine term approaching
negative infinity as θi grows unbounded. Therefore, there exists θmaxi such that (15) becomes neg-
ative for θi ≥ θmaxi . As scuh, we restrict our attention for a Nash equilibrium within the compact
interval [0, θmaxi ]. Existence of a Nash equilibrium for GFTR
(
B˜, 0, α, β,αk,βk
)
is established by
invoking (Rosen 1965, Theorem 1). A bid profile θNE =
(
θNE1 , . . . , θ
NE
N
)
is a Nash equilibrium if
and only if (27) are satisfied where pii is replaced with p˜ii and βB2i with θ
max
i . The payoff derivative
is given by
∂p˜ii(θi,θ−i)
∂θi
=
β
(
Bi +
∑
k
βk
β f
k
i
)
[P2(1ᵀ B) + 4β1ᵀ θ]1/2
− 1 = βB˜i
[P2(1ᵀ B) + 4β1ᵀ θ]1/2
− 1.
The rest of proof is similar to that of Proposition 1.
D Proof of Proposition 3
We begin by showing existence of a Nash equilibrium. First note that if 1ᵀ θNE = 0, then the CTS
revenue for player i becomes zero, yet she incurs transaction costs equal to cBi > 0. Hence, player
i can unilaterally deviate by infinitesimally increasing θi to a positive value to reduce her costs.
As such, θNE = 0 cannot occur at the equilibrium. We can, therefore, restrict our analysis to the
region 1ᵀ θ > 0. The payoff in (17) is continuous in θ and concave in θi for a fixed θ−i. Moreover,
each player has no incentive to bid θi ≥ βB2, as this yields negative transport offers. Hence we
can restrict the strategy space in
[
0, βB2
]
. Existence of a Nash equilibrium follows from (Chen
et al. 2004, Theorem 3).
We are in search for a symmetric equilibrium for Gconj(B, c, α, β, αSO, βSO). From first order
conditions we find that the payoff’s derivative is given by
∂pii(θi,θ−i)
∂θi
=
βB
2p (θ, B1)
− 1 + c
[
1
p (θ, B1)
− θi
2p (θ, B1)1ᵀ θ
]
, (34)
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where p (θ, B1) =
√
β1ᵀ θ. For θNEi > 0 we require (34) to vanish, yielding the following
θNEi
1ᵀ θNE
=
βB
c
+ 2− 2
c
√
β1ᵀ θ. (35)
Summing (35) over i’s we find
√
1ᵀ θNE =
1
N
√
β
(
NBβ
2
+
c
2
(2N − 1)
)
> 0. (36)
From (36) and (35) we find that
θNEi =
1
4Nβ
(
βB + c(2− 1
N
)
)2
, (37)
which is strictly positive. The solution of (3) with PSO yields the CTS schedule
QCTS =
1
2
(QTO +NB)− 1
2βSO
√
(αSO − βSONB)2 + 4βSO1ᵀ θ. (38)
Substituting (37) in (38) we obtain the expression in Proposition 3.
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